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One of the main purposes of our study is to examine the variations in
effective tax rates among the four countries and to explain the main
reasons for these differences. A summary of the major results for each
country has been presented in the appropriate chapter. In section 7.1 we
analyze the results more fully, placing particular emphasis on compari-
sons across countries. Such comparisons help to place the results for any
one country in perspective and to shed light on some key relationships
such as the effect of inflation on effective tax rates. As shown in section
7.2, this effect differs significantly from one country to another. In section
7.3 we also examine the extent to which differences in tax rates are
attributable to differences in the tax systems or to differences in the
importance of particular industries, assets, sources of finance, and
owners.
In addition to these basic questions, we examine in section 7.4 the
sensitivity of the estimated tax rates to the values of p (in the fixed-p case)
and r (in the fixed-r case) at which they are evaluated. At different
inflation rates, we evaluate the tax rates at constant average net of
personal tax rates of return. The question of how sensitive our results are
to this assumption is tackled in section 7.5. Finally, for each country we
calculate the distribution of effective marginal tax rates.
7.1 Comparing Results under Standard Assumptions
Let us first summarize the results with the standard parameters for each
country. Table 7.1 shows effective tax rates in the fixed-p case for the four
countries. From the final row of table 7.1 we see that the highest overall
effective marginal tax rate is the 48 percent rate in West Germany,
followed by 37 percent in the United States, 36 percent in Sweden, and
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Table 7.1 Actual Effective Tax Rates for Each Country, Fixed-p Case













































































only 4 percent in the United Kingdom. The overall rate for each country
is an average of the effective marginal tax rates for the eighty-one
combinations, weighted by the proportion of capital in each combination.
These weights, together with all 1980 input parameters for each country,
are shown in Appendix A, and the matrixes of tax rates for different
combinations and inflation rates in the four countries are given in Appen-
dix B.
Each row in table 7.1 shows a weighted average tax rate for a subset of
combinations. For example, the first row shows the average tax rate over
all combinations that include machinery. From this row we can see that
immediate expensing of machinery is a major reason for the low overall
rate in the United Kingdom. The effective tax rate on machinery is minus
37 percent, while other assets are taxed at over 39 percent. Britain has the
lowest total tax on machinery and the highest share of machinery in its
capital stock.' Sweden's exponential depreciation of machinery at a 30
1. The first matrix of weights in Appendix A shows the proportion of capital stock that is
used in each combination of asset and industry. If we add across the three industries in each
country, we find that machinery is 47 percent of total capital in Britain, 42 percent in West
Germany, 32 percent in Sweden, and 22 percent in the United States. The high percentage
in Britain can be explained by the tax advantages afforded machinery, and the low percent-
age in the United States can be explained by the fact that a larger proportion of utilities are
private corporations in the United States than in Europe. Since there are more struc-
ture-intensive utilities in the "other industry" category, the United States has a lower
relative total weight on machinery.270 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
percent annual rate for tax purposes is considerably more than the 7 to 20
percent rates that we estimate for economic depreciation. This acceler-
ated depreciation plus the 11 percent investment grant means that the
total corporate and personal tax wedge on machinery in Sweden is zero.
Accelerated depreciation plus a 10 percent grant in the United States
implies that the total tax on machinery is 18 percent,
2 while tax lives of
eleven years and only 2 percent credits in Germany result in a tax rate on
machinery of 45 percent. The effective tax rate on investment in buildings
is strikingly similar in all four countries, with rates ranging from 36 to 43
percent. The row for inventories demonstrates the importance of infla-
tion accounting, since the lower tax rates are in the United Kingdom and
United States, where FIFO accounting is not obligatory for tax purposes,
while 59 and 69 percent tax rates are found in Germany and Sweden,
where half of inventories and all of inventories, respectively, are on FIFO
accounting.
Looking at the industry breakdown in the United Kingdom, the tax
rate for manufacturing is lowest because of the high weight on machinery
and because that industry receives extra grants for machinery. The "other
industry" category, although qualifying for lower grants, has a higher
relative weight on machinery. The more interesting aspect of the industry
breakdown, however, is that in Germany and Sweden the tax rate in
"other industry" is higher than the overall rate, and in the United
Kingdom and the United States it is lower than the overall rate. The low
United States rate reflects the availability of investment tax credits for
both machinery and buildings in utilities. The higher tax rates in Ger-
many and Sweden reflect larger weights on buildings and inventories,
respectively. These assets receive less generous depreciation allowances
and lower grants.
In the breakdown by source of finance, the United Kingdom again
provides the most striking contrast. Debt-financed investments are heav-
ily subsidized, since assets receive accelerated or immediate depreciation
and corporate interest payments are fully deductible from taxable in-
come. Investment financed by new share issues receives a small subsidy
because of the tax credits for dividends afforded by the imputation system
of corporation tax. Only investment projects financed by retained earn-
ings are taxed at positive rates in Britain. In all four countries tax
deductibility of interest payments keeps down the tax rate on debt
finance. Because of the imputation system both in Germany and the
2. The overall rate on machinery is zero in Sweden and 18 percent in the United States,
but we cannot infer that depreciation of machinery is more accelerated in Sweden. Indeed,
as shown in table 7.5, the rate in Sweden exceeds the rate in the United States when we use a
common set of weights. Instead, the zero rate for machinery in Sweden can be explained by
the fact that Sweden has proportionately more of machinery in manufacturing and that this
industry uses proportionately more debt than in the United States. All weights for each
industry are shown in Appendix A.271 Comparing Results under Standard Assumptions
United Kingdom, the tax rate on projects financed by new share issues is
lower than that on projects financed by retained earnings. In Sweden and
the United States, in contrast, the relative positions of the two sources of
equity finance are reversed. The United States imposes both corporate
and personal taxes on dividends, while Sweden's Annell deduction is not
enough to offset a similar double tax.
Finally, table 7.1 shows effective tax rates by ownership category.
These rates reflect the differences in personal rates on interest and
dividends in each country that are shown in Appendix A. Households in
Sweden and Germany have particularly high personal tax rates, and
effective marginal tax rates on projects financed directly from households
are 105 and 71 percent, respectively. In Germany, however, tax-exempt
institutions do not receive refunds of dividend tax credits or withholding
taxes, so that only in Germany is the tax wedge positive for projects
financed by tax-exempt institutions.
In other countries tax-exempt institutions are subsidized because their
receipts of income are tax free and the corporations in which they invest
receive deductions for interest payments, accelerated depreciation, in-
vestment grants, and in certain cases credits for dividends paid. The
position of insurance companies is rather different. Although they are, on
average, subsidized in Britain and Germany, they are taxed at positive
rates in Sweden and the United States. We discovered that in all four
countries the taxation of insurance companies was an extremely complex
matter. The effective tax rate depends critically on special provisions,
such as the possibility of making tax-free allocations to reserves. These
provisions imply that the tax may be quite different from the statutory
corporate rate applying to insurance companies and can increase rapidly
with inflation (see section 7.2).
The tax rates shown in table 7.1 refer to projects that are all assumed to
earn a pretax rate of return of 10 percent per annum. These figures
describe the incentives provided by the tax schedule but do not tell us
what revenue we would expect to collect at the margin corresponding to a
small increase in the capital stock as a whole. This is because we might
expect investments to be pushed to the point at which all projects yield
the same rate of return before deduction of personal taxes. This arbitrage
equilibrium we call the fixed-r case. It gives greater weight to the more
highly taxed combinations, because it is these combinations that require a
higher pretax rate of return in order to generate funds to pay the given
market rate of return. The results for the fixed-r case are shown in table
7.2. As mentioned above, the weighted-average tax rates in table 7.2 will
generally be larger than those in table 7.1 fof the fixed-/? case.
3 The overall
3. If the tax system were linear, then the effective tax rate calculated for a particular
combination would not depend on the choice of p or r in either the fixed-p or the fixed-r
calculations. Since individual tax rates would then be the same in both cases, any weighted-272 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
Table 7.2 Actual Effective Tax Rates for Each Country, Fixed-r Case














































































marginal tax rates in the fixed-r case are 30 percent in the United King-
dom, 50 percent in the United States, 54 percent in Sweden, and 65
percent in West Germany.
Although the absolute values of the tax rates shown in table 7.2 are
higher than those in table 7.1, the patterns of variations of tax rates both
among countries and across combinations remain the same. Investment
in machinery is subsidized in the United Kingdom, pays virtually no tax in
Sweden, and is taxed at higher positive rates in the United States and
especially in West Germany. Tax rates on investments in inventories are
highest in Sweden and Germany. Investment in the United Kingdom is
taxed less heavily in manufacturing than in other industries, whereas in
the United States manufacturing pays a higher tax rate than other sectors
of the economy.
It is clear that investment financed by borrowing is much less heavily
taxed than that financed by equity. In three of the four countries such
average in the fixed-r case must be greater than the corresponding weighted-average in the
fixed-/? case. The tax system is not linear, however, so the individual tax rates depend on the
chosenp of 10 percent in table 7.1, and on the chosen r of 5 percent in table 7.2. Since the tax
rates for individual combinations are not identical in the two cases, averages over tax rates in
the fixed-r case do not necessarily exceed those in the fixed-/? case. Indeed, when we average
over all combinations involving a particular asset, industry, source, or owner, the fixed-r tax
rate in table 7.2 is sometimes less than the corresponding fixed-/? rate of table 7.1.273 Effects of Inflation on Marginal Tax Rates
projects are subsidized, and in the exception, Sweden, they receive a tax
rate of only 11.5 percent. In Britain the subsidy is sufficiently large that
the required pretax rate of return, necessary to generate a 5 percent rate
of return before personal taxes to savers, is actually negative. Thus the
factor income net of depreciation that would be produced in arbitrage
equilibrium is negative, and the use of this factor income as the denomi-
nator of an estimated tax rate would produce figures with a sign opposite
from that corresponding to our intuition. The tax wedge on debt finance
in the United Kingdom is negative, and in table 7.2 the implied tax rate
would be positive because of the negative pretax rate of return. Hence
this figure is omitted. One advantage of reporting the results in the form
of the implied tax wedge (p — s) is that the sign of the wedge always
corresponds to the effect of the tax system on the incentive to save and
invest.
Finally, there are substantial differences in the effective tax rates levied
according to the identity of the provider of the funds for the project.
Tax-exempt institutions receive a net subsidy in all countries except
Germany, whereas in all four countries projects financed directly by
households pay extremely high tax rates.
7.2 Effects of Inflation on Marginal Tax Rates
Section 4 of each country chapter provides estimates of tax rates for
inflation rates of zero, 10 percent per annum, and the estimated actual
inflation rate during the period 1970-79. In this section we investigate
more systematically the effect of inflation on marginal tax rates. Figure
7.1 shows the overall effective marginal tax rates in the fixed-p case for
inflation rates varying from zero to 15 percent. The figure illustrates some
major differences among the four countries. In particular, overall mar-
ginal tax rates in Germany and the United States are rather insensitive to
the rate of inflation, whereas in Sweden and Britain the tax rate is much
more dependent on the inflation rate. But the influence of inflation is in
opposite directions for the latter two countries. At zero inflation both
countries have an overall marginal tax rate of about 13 percent, but as
inflation increases the tax rate rises in Sweden and falls in the United
Kingdom.
To discuss figure 7.1 and the different net effects of inflation in each
country, it is useful first to summarize four separate effects of inflation
that might operate in any one country.
4 First, a marginal investment in
1980 typically has future depreciation allowances that are based on
4. We concentrate here on four effects of inflation because they serve to explain figure
7.1. Inflation might also (a) raise taxes on capital gains if the tax base is not indexed, (b) push
taxpayers into higher brackets if the tax schedule is not indexed, and (c) reduce the real tax
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Fig. 7.1 Overall effective tax rate as inflation varies in each country.
historical cost (the 1980 purchase price for the asset). Since inflation
reduces the real value of these fixed nominal deductions, it tends to
increase effective tax rates. As inflation increases further, however, the
real value of depreciation allowances falls at a reduced rate: only at an
infinite rate of inflation does the real value of these deductions approach
zero. For this reason the effect of historical cost depreciation becomes
less important with successive increases in the rate of inflation. It is also
less important in Britain, where machinery receives immediate expensing
and hence inflation has no effect on the vector of such allowances.
Second, inflation increases the nominal interest rate. Where nominal
interest payments are deductible from the corporate income tax, inflation
tends to increase these deductions and decrease the overall tax rate. At
the same time, where nominal interest receipts are included in the per-
sonal income tax base, inflation tends to increase these receipts and
increase the overall tax. In combination, since the corporate rate is
greater than the personal rate averaged over investors in all of our
countries, inflation tends to decrease overall taxes.
Third, inflation increases the nominal value of inventories. Under
FIFO inventory accounting, taxable profits are measured by the differ-
ence between nominal sales price and nominal costs. Thus, for given real
magnitudes, inflation tends to increase taxable nominal profits and in-
crease the effective tax rate. This effect depends on the proportion of
assets held as inventories.
Fourth, tax rules for insurance companies can exacerbate the effects of
inflation. In the United States and Sweden, insurance companies are
allowed deductions for reserves that are based on fixed nominal interest
rate assumptions. As inflation increases nominal interest receipts, it275 Effects of Inflation on Marginal Tax Rates
reduces the real value of deductions for reserves. The entire addition to
the nominal return is taxed, even if it is needed to meet reserve obliga-
tions. As a result, inflation tends to increase the effective tax rate pro-
portionately.
These four effects of inflation operate in different directions and with
different magnitudes in each country, but the total effects are shown in
figure 7.1. In Germany, for example, the tax rate starts at 45 percent with
no inflation. It tends to increase because of historical cost depreciation
and inventory accounting, but it tends to decrease because of nominal
interest deductions at a corporate rate that exceeds the personal rate. The
net effect is positive at first, but the effect of historical cost depreciation
diminishes with further inflation. Nominal interest deductions become
relatively more important at a 5 percent rate of inflation, and further
inflation reduces the total tax.
The same general story applies to the United States, except that the
effect of FIFO inventory accounting is replaced by the effect of nominal
reserve allowances for insurance companies. Taxes increase with infla-
tion, but at a diminishing rate as the effect of historical cost depreciation
diminishes. The curve becomes almost flat at high rates of inflation,
where the tax-increasing effects of insurance rules are almost exactly
offset by the tax-reducing effects of nominal interest deductions at a
corporate rate that exceeds the personal rate.
Most effects operate in the same direction for Sweden. First, deprecia-
tion is allowed on a historical cost basis. Second, Sweden requires FIFO
inventory accounting. Third, insurance companies are allowed only a
fixed nominal return for reserves. Finally, nominal interest is taxed at a
weighted-average marginal rate that is almost as high as the corporate
rate. (Sections 4.2.5 and 4.4.3 find that the effective corporate rate in
Sweden was 35 percent in 1980.) The combination of these four effects for
Sweden itself is dramatic, but the contrast with Britain in figure 7.1 is
tremendous. Nominal interest in Britain is deducted at the 52 percent
corporate rate, and it is received by households with an average 28
percent rate, tax-exempt institutions, or insurance companies with a 17
percent rate. This effect swamps that of historical cost depreciation.
Although some buildings in Britain receive delayed depreciation at his-
torical cost, other assets are expensed. Inflation does not operate to
increase taxes through investment in inventories or saving through insur-
ance companies. As a result, overall taxes start at about 13 percent of the
pretax return, fall with inflation, and keep falling as inflation increases.
Figure 7.1 does not show differential effects of inflation among com-
binations in each country. To investigate differences among assets, indus-
tries, financial sources, or owners, we start with tax rates for zero inflation
in table 7.3. These tax rates for each country are taken from the zero-
inflation column of the first table of results in each country chapter. The276 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
Table 7.3 Actual Effective Tax Rates for
Each Country with Zero Inflation, Fixed-p Case













































































columns for the United Kingdom and Sweden demonstrate that these two
countries not only start at the same overall 13 percent effective tax rate
with no inflation, but also start with very similar tax rates on particular
combinations. Machinery is subsidized in both countries, because of
accelerated or immediate depreciation, and other assets are taxed. Debt
is subsidized in both countries, because of interest deductions at the
corporate level, and other sources of finance are taxed. Tax-exempt
institutions are subsidized, and households are taxed.
There, however, the similarity ends. Table 7.4 shows, for each com-
bination in each country, the differential effect of inflation. Each entry
shows the addition (or subtraction) to the tax rate in that combination for
an increase of inflation from 6 percent to 7 percent. Almost all the entries
for the United Kingdom are negative, and almost all the entries for
Sweden are positive. One percentage point of inflation reduces British
taxes by one percentage point for machinery, by five points for debt, and
by three points for tax-exempt institutions. The one point of inflation
raises Swedish taxes by four points for inventories, by four points for
insurance companies, and by five full points for households. It even
increases the tax rate on debt by two percentage points.
Finally, we might also be interested in the variance of the effects of
inflation within each categorization. Among owners in the United States,277 Differences among the Four Countries


















































































for example, an extra point of inflation adds five points to the tax rate on
insurance companies and subtracts 4.5 points from the tax rate on tax-
exempt institutions. This difference of 9.5 points is larger than the differ-
ence among owners in any other country. Britain has the smallest differ-
ence among owners. Among sources of finance, Germany has the largest
differences ( — 5.1 for debt and +3.7 for retained earnings, for a differ-
ence of 8.8), and Sweden has the smallest. Among industries, Germany
has the largest differences, and Britain has the smallest. Finally, among
assets in each country, Sweden has the largest differences, and Britain the
smallest. Thus, we conclude that, although inflation reduces overall taxes
in Britain, it does so on a comparatively uniform basis.
7.3 Differences among the Four Countries
While the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany
show obvious differences in the tax treatments of different assets, they
also differ in the relative stocks of each asset. The weighted-average tax
rates differ for both these reasons. Second, while we have found clear
differences in the way inflation affects tax rates in each country, there are
also differences in actual rates of inflation. Tax rates differ for both these
reasons as well. Finally, while new investments receive different grants278 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
and allowances in each country, they also have different actual rates of
depreciation. They thus have differences in the rates at which reinvest-
ment qualifies for new grants and allowances. This section investigates
how much of the overall tax rate differences is attributable to tax law and
how much is due, instead, to differences in the measured weights, infla-
tion rates, or actual depreciation rates.
To perform this decomposition, we first recalculate tax rates for each
country, using its own parameter values everywhere except for a common
set of weights. We recalculate tax rates again with own parameters
everywhere except for a common inflation rate, and then with own
parameters except for a common set of actual depreciation rates. Finally,
we recalculate tax rates for each country using its own tax parameters, but
using common weights, inflation rates, and actual depreciation rates.
The choices for the common weights, inflation rate, or depreciation
rates are essentially arbitrary. We might select the weights or rates from
any one of the four countries, or we might apply to each country an
average set of weights or rates. We do not wish to introduce a fifth set of
weights, however, even if it is an average of the four countries, because
such parameters would not reflect any actual experiences. Instead, we
select United States weights and rates for the standard of comparison.
Table 7.5 reflects results of the first simulation, which attempts to
answer two questions. First, What would be the effective marginal tax
rates in each country if they all had the United States mix of assets,
industries, sources of finance, and owners? Second, or conversely, How
much of existing tax rate differences are attributable to different weights
on each category? If all countries provided the same relative tax treat-
ments to different assets, industries, sources, or owners, then we would
not expect taxes to cause differences in the distribution of capital among
those components. If relative tax treatments differ, however, then we
might expect substitution among production processes to allow relatively
more use of a particularly tax-favored asset, more output of a tax-favored
industry, more finance through a tax-favored source, or more savings
channeled through a pension fund, insurance company, or other particu-
larly tax-favored ownership category. Since there are these differences
among countries, we might expect the switch to a common set of weights
in each case to put less weight on particular tax-favored investments and
thus to raise the overall average tax rate.
5
The fourth column of table 7.5, for the United States, is identical to
that of table 7.1. Since weights for the United States have not changed,
the overall rate is still 37 percent in the fixed-/? case. The overall rate for
5. Tax rates for Britain, Sweden, and Germany rise as expected in table 7.5 when those
countries are given weights from the United States. In other experiments, however, this
result does not hold. When other countries are assigned the debt-intensive weights from
Sweden, for example, some effective tax rates fall.279 Differences among the Four Countries




















































































Britain, however, has increased from 3.7 to 11.6 percent. This overall
change results primarily from the fact that the United States has a much
lower weight for machinery than does the United Kingdom, where
machinery is subsidized. It is somewhat offset by the fact that the United
States has more weight on debt, which Britain also subsidizes.
The overall tax rate in Sweden increases from 36 to 58 percent when
United States weights are employed. Zero-taxed machinery is given less
weight, low-taxed debt is given much less weight, and the highly taxed
households are given relatively more weight. Moreover, because United
States statistics include more privately owned utilities in the other indus-
try category, this highly taxed sector is also assigned more weight with the
United States proportions. In West Germany, the overall tax rises from
48 to 58 percent when United States weights are employed. Again, the
"other industrial" sector plays a major role, because it is the most highly
taxed sector in Germany, and its weights are the largest in the United
States. Also, debt changes from a net subsidy to a tax, because relatively
more of it is held by households in the United States. Individual compo-
nents can be further investigated by considering the individual country
weights as shown in Appendix A.
Thus, as expected, overall tax rates of all countries increase when
common weights are employed. The differences, however, remain intact.280 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
The spread actually increases from forty-four percentage points (the
difference between 48.1 for Germany and 3.7 for the United Kingdom) to
forty-six percentage points (the difference between 57.5 and 11.6 for the
same two countries). According to these experiments, then, differences
in weights by themselves do not account for any of the overall tax rate
differences.
Next we turn to inflation. How much of the actual tax rate differences
would remain if all countries had the same rate of inflation? This question
can be answered by looking at the zero inflation column of each country's
1980 results table (brought together in table 7.3) or by looking at the 10
percent column of each 1980 results table. For consistency, in table 7.6,
we look at the tax rates that would exist in each country with 6.77 percent
inflation, the actual United States rate of inflation.
Again tax rates in the United States are the same as they were before.
Tax rates in other countries rise or fall, as can be seen from figure 7.1.
Since taxes in Britain fall with inflation, and since the United States
inflation rate is less than the United Kingdom rate, the 3.7 percent tax
rate for Britain in table 7.1 rises to 8.9 in table 7.6. This overall change
reflects smaller subsidies on machinery, debt, and tax-exempt institu-
tions, as well as higher positive taxes on other categories. Since taxes in
Sweden rise with inflation, and since the United States inflation rate is

















































































37.2281 Differences among the Four Countries
less than the Swedish rate, the 35.6 percent tax rate in table 7.1 falls to
29.5 in table 7.6. Finally, note that the figure 7.1 tax rate curve for
Germany reaches its highest point at a 5 percent rate of inflation and then
starts to decline. Since the German inflation rate is 4.2 percent and the
comparison here is at a rate of 6.77 percent, the overall tax rate is hardly
affected. The flatness of that curve incorporates offsetting effects, how-
ever, so there is a higher tax on inventories and a lower tax on debt.
According to these experiments, then, some of the actual tax rate
differences can be attributed to inflation-rate differences. The forty-four
point spread in table 7.1 falls to a thirty-nine point spread in table 7.6
(47.9 for Germany minus 8.9 for the United Kingdom). This conclusion is
not robust, however, as can be seen from figure 7.1. For any two coun-
tries in that diagram, tax rates may become more similar at one common
inflation rate and less similar at a different common inflation rate.
Finally, we ask, How much of the differences in tax rates may be
attributed to differences in actual depreciation rates? We have two
reasons for addressing this question. First, we want to isolate differences
attributable solely to tax law. Of course, the tax law can induce producers
to alter the maintenance or type of particular assets employed. Second,
each of our country chapters uses its own procedures to derive estimates
of actual depreciation. These methodological differences might contrib-
ute to apparent effective tax rate differences.
Table 7.7 shows calculations for all countries when we use only United
States depreciation rates. As shown in Appendix A, these rates for
buildings are greater than those for Britain and Sweden but less than
those for Germany. The United States rates for machinery are approx-
imately in the middle of those for other countries but depend on indus-
trial location. Substitution of these parameters serves to reduce the
overall tax rates in Britain and Germany and slightly increase that in
Sweden. The spread between the low rate of Britain and the high rate of
Germany is essentially unchanged.
While these factors sometimes greatly affect individual combinations,
we conclude that none has a major impact on the differences in overall tax
rates among countries. In table 7.8, however, we take all these factors
together and calculate effective tax rates when all countries have the
same weights, inflation rates, and depreciation rates. Because these
factors are not independent, they have more of an effect together than
they do separately. Taken together, these factors increase the tax in
Britain for two reasons: we use less weight on Britain's subsidized
machinery, and we use a lower rate of inflation. The overall rate in the
United Kingdom increases from 3.7 to 18.9 percent, while that in Ger-
many increases only from 48.1 to 52.6 percent. The spread thus falls from
44.4 to 33.7 percent. These remaining differences can be attributed solely
to tax law.282 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
All the calculations above referred to the fixed-/? case. In table 7.9 we
show comparable calculations for the fixed-r case. When all countries
have all their own parameters, fixed-r tax rates vary between the 30
percent rate for Britain and the 65 percent rate for Germany (as shown in
table 7.2). When all countries have their own tax parameters but United
States weights, depreciation, and inflation, fixed-r tax rates vary between
42 percent for Britain and almost 70 percent for Sweden (as shown in
table 7.9). The spread thus falls from thirty-five points to twenty-eight
points. Changes in the individual components of any country can be
explained by arguments similar to those for the fixed-/? case above.
7.4 Sensitivity to Assumed Rates of Return
In general, the measured effective tax rate depends on the assumed
value for p or r in the fixed-/? or fixed-r calculations. Are our estimates
relatively robust to these choices, or do they depend greatly on the
assumed rate of return? This section discusses the possible reasons for
this dependence and then calculates different effective tax rates for
different rates of return.
In a linear system, the tax is a constant fraction of the pretax return.
Table 7.7 Effective Tax Rates for Each Country,
with United States Depreciation Rates, Fixed-/? Case












































































37.2283 Sensitivity to Assumed Rates of Return
Thus the tax rate is independent of the pretax or posttax rate of return. In
general, however, tax systems are not linear. The tax rate depends on the
present value of depreciation allowances, which depends nonlinearly on
the rate of return used for discounting. The importance of this point
justifies some algebraic elaboration. In chapter 2, equation (2.23) pro-
vides a complicated expression for the pretax return (p) as a function of
the corporate tax rate (T), the firm's discount rate (p), the depreciation
rate (8), the present value of allowances (A), and other parameters. In
order to focus on the main issue and to avoid unnecessary complications,
we consider the case with LIFO accounting (v = 0), no corporate wealth
taxes (wc — 0), and no inflation (TT = 0 or, equivalently, complete
indexation for inflation). In this simple case, (2.23) reduces to
(7.1) ^42 p ^4(p + 8)8. (1-T)
Also in chapter 2, equations (2.24) to (2.27) provide expressions for the
firm's discount rates when finance is obtained by debt, new share issues
(NSI), and retained earnings (RE). If we take a classical corporate tax
system (0 = 1) and ignore capital gains taxes (z = 0), then these
equations reduce to
Table 7.8 Effective Tax Rates for Each Country,
with 6.77 Percent Inflation, United States Depreciation,
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PDEBT = r{l ~ V
(7-2) pNSI = r
pRF = r(\ — m),
where m is the personal tax rate. The real interest rate r is equal to the
nominal rate i, since inflation is assumed to be zero here. Finally, the
saver's posttax real rate of return in equation (2.6) reduces to
(7.3) s = r{l-m).
With these formulas, for any source of finance we can calculate the
effective tax rate t = (p — s)lp. Starting with r, for example, we have s
and p directly as linear functions. In general, however, the present value
term A is not a linear function of p, so the tax is not linear in r. Similarly, if
we start with a value for p, we can generally find a value for p that is
consistent with equation (7.1). However, it also will depend nonlinearly
on the initial/? chosen. The tax rate remains a nonlinear function of/?.
Suppose, however, that there are no cash grants or immediate expens-
ing (f2 = fj, = 0), and that depreciation allowances are equal to economic
depreciation at replacement cost. In this case, the present value of
allowances is285 Sensitivity to Assumed Rates of Return
(7.4) A=Ad = jfbt
o 8 + p
and equation (7.1) reduces simply to
(7.5) p = _ P
1-T
Now the three effective tax rates reduce to
=
 m
(7.6) fNSI = T + w(l - T)
^RE = T .
That is, interest is deductible at the corporate level, so the return to debt
is taxed only at the personal rate m. The return to equity is taxed only at
the corporate rate T if it is retained, but the after-tax profits are taxed
again at the personal rate if the earnings are distributed.
Equations (7.6) make clear that these effective tax rates do not depend
on p or r. The system is linear in that the tax is a constant fraction of any
pretax return. Our effective tax rate formulas provide global estimates of
the tax rate, in either the fixed-/? case or the fixed-r case, for any initial p
or r.
In our example above, linearity depends upon the assumption of
economic depreciation at replacement cost.
6 Actual tax systems conform
neither to an income tax on properly measured income nor to a consump-
tion tax. In particular, depreciation allowances are often accelerated
relative to economic depreciation. Because these tax advantages are
delayed, the effective tax rate depends on their present value and thus
nonlinearly on the rate of discount. For these reasons, there is no such
number as the effective tax rate. Different estimates are obtained for
different values of/? and r. It is very important, therefore, to investigate
the sensitivity of results to the initial poxr. For reasons of space, we limit
this investigation to the standard 1980 parameters in each country. We
also limit the investigation to one example, machinery in the manufactur-
ing sector. Our sensitivity analysis should consider the most sensitive
case, and machinery has differentially accelerated depreciation allow-
ances. It is therefore expected to exhibit some of the greatest nonlineari-
6. Auerbach and Jorgenson (1980) suggest a "first-year recovery" system where the
investor receives only an immediate deduction, equal to the present value of actual depre-
ciation on the asset. All internally financed investments are then subject to a uniform tax
rate T, from equation (7.6). This is not the only linear tax system, however. At the other
extreme, immediate expensing in our simple case provides a uniform rate of zero on all
internally financed assets. Brown (1981) suggests that any uniform rate between zero and T
can be obtained by providing a common rate of grant that is proportional not to the purchase
price of the asset, but to the purchase price minus the first-year deduction.286 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
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Fig. 7.2 Effective tax rate on machinery as p varies in each country.
ties. We weight over owners and sources of finance to calculate the total
tax wedge or tax rate on the "average" investment in manufacturing
machinery in each country.
Figure 7.2 plots, for each country, the effective tax rate on machinery
as the pretax return varies from 1 to 30 percent. These calculations are for
the fixed-/? case, and the firm's discount rate is linked by our formulas to
this pretax return. For machinery in the United Kingdom, immediate
expensing means that the discount rate does not affect the present value
of depreciation allowances, but additional grants ensure that the asset
receives a subsidy at any pretax return. When this subsidy is expressed as
a fraction of a 1 percent pretax return or less, the rate of subsidy becomes
arbitrarily large. Because the rate of tax or subsidy is misleading in such
cases, we also show the tax wedge in figure 7.3. As the pretax return
becomes small, the negative wedge in Britain is reduced in absolute size,
although it becomes a larger fraction of p.
In Sweden, as we see in table 7.1, the total tax on the average new
investment in machinery is approximately zero. The wedge (p ~ s) is
zero, so the wedge as a fraction of/? is also zero. As a result, the curves for
Sweden in figures 7.2 and 7.3 are rather flat at a zero value for the tax rate.
To interpret the curves for Germany and the United States, consider
first a hypothetical case with no inflation but with accelerated deprecia-
tion and investment grants. When the pretax return is relatively low, the
discount rate is also relatively low, and the delayed depreciation allow-
ances are more important. A subsidy may result in such a case, and it may
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Fig. 7.3 Effective tax wedge (p — s) on machinery as p varies in each
country.
depreciation allowances become less important, and the tax may rise to
zero or above. In such a case, the curve would look like that of the United
Kingdom.
With significant inflation, as in the United States, or with long asset
lifetimes, as in Germany, depreciation allowances on historical cost may
be less than economic depreciation at replacement cost. In such cases the
tax wedge may be positive, and it may be an arbitrarily high fraction of a
very small p. Moreover, as p (or the discount rate) increases, the dis-
advantageous depreciation allowances become less important, and the
effective tax rate falls. Figure 7.3 shows that the tax wedges in the United
States and Germany are small at low/?, even if they are a high fraction ofp
as shown in figure 7.2.
An important aspect of figures 7.2 and 7.3 is that the curves do not
cross. At actual inflation rates and standard 1980 parameters, the choice
of p does not affect the conclusion that the highest tax rates are in
Germany, followed by the United States, Sweden, and the United King-
dom. Moreover, while the amount of tax naturally increases with the
earnings from the asset, as shown in figure 7.3, the tax rate curves of
figure 7.2 have large segments that are fairly flat. Beyond some critical
value ofp, the tax rate is not much affected by further changes in p. Our
standard calculations use a p of 10 percent, clearly beyond this critical
point.
Similar analyses are performed for the fixed-r methodology in figures
7.4 and 7.5. Curves for Germany and the United States are very similar to







10 15 20 25














10 15 20 25
INTEREST RATE r (IN PERCENT)
30 35
Fig. 7.5 Effective tax wedge (p - s) on machinery as r varies in each
country.
implies a small positive wedge for machinery in manufacturing.
7 When r is
1 percent in this case, the value of p is only 0.1 percent. A small denomi-
nator makes the tax rate misleadingly high.
For the United Kingdom, figure 7.5 demonstrates that machinery is
clearly subsidized at any value for r. As r is reduced to about 2 percent,
however, the subsidy (p — s) becomes equal to the whole return to the
7. Table 7.2 shows a small subsidy for machinery in Sweden when r is fixed at 5 percent,
but that calculation considers an average over all industries, sources, and owners. Here,
when we look at machinery only in manufacturing, we have a small positive tax at any value
for r.289 Sensitivity to Assumed Rates of Return
saver (s). Since the government provides the saver's entire return, the
asset need earn nothing. The pretax return/? is zero, and the subsidy rate
(/? — s)lp is not defined. At even lower values for r, the subsidy is even
larger than the saver's return, and the asset can make a loss. A negative
wedge (p — s) divided by a negative p implies a positive rate in spite of
the subsidy.
We need a common standard for comparing taxes on different assets or
in different countries. The tax-inclusive effective rate (p — s)lp is a
logical candidate, because it corresponds to our general conception of a
tax rate and because it reduces to the statutory rate in special cases.
Because p can be zero or negative, however, this rate is sometimes not
useful for drawing comparisons. The tax-exclusive rate (p - s)ls is a
logical alternative, but the next section describes cases where s can be
zero or negative as well. Both rates are subject to misleadingly wide
variations when their denominators are close to zero. The remaining
alternative is to report the tax wedge (p - s); in this case we do not have a
denominator. This effective tax measure always has the "correct" sign,
and it can be interpreted as a wealth tax rate, the percentage of the asset
value paid in tax each year. As the earnings of the asset increase in figures
7.3 and 7.5, so does the amount of tax or subsidy. The tax wedge thus
appears to be sensitive to higher rates of return, but this is a consequence
of the fact that the tax rates level off in figures 7.2 and 7.4.
These diagrams demonstrate clearly the nonlinear aspects of our effec-
tive tax formulas. The tax rates in figures 7.2 and 7.4 are particularly
nonlinear because/? appears in the denominator. Even the tax wedges in
figures 7.3 and 7.5 are nonlinear, however, because p is a nonlinear
function of r. Both wedges and rates are sensitive to the choice of/? or r,
so care must be taken in their interpretation.
One other interesting result can be explained with the use of the
equations given above. It turns out that the effective tax rate is related
inversely to the personal tax rate m in some instances. In the United
States, for example, the effective tax rates in some categories are raised
by the use of "low tax" parameters or reduced by the use of "high tax"
parameters. In particular, the effective tax rate on retained earnings is 67
percent with the low value for m, 62 percent with the standard value for
m, and only 58 percent with the high value for m (see tables 6.20 and
6.23).
This result derives from the arbitrage assumption of chapter 2. In
equilibrium, savers are assumed to require the same net-of-tax real return
on any investment, in any asset or industry. Thus s is always given by the
real net-of-tax interest rate, whatever source of finance is actually used.
Consider an increase in the personal tax rate m on interest income. The
value of s falls for a given r. Since equity does not actually pay the tax on
interest income, however, the firm can earn a lower gross return on the
asset and still provide a net return equal to that on interest income. In290 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
other words, the cost of capital for retained earnings falls. Whether the
gross return p falls by more or less than the net return s depends on
depreciation deductions. If depreciation allowances are not immediate,
and the higher m implies a lower discount rate for the firm, then the
present value of allowances rises. In this case the required return/? falls
by more than s, and the tax wedge is reduced. In effect, the increase in m
raises the relative advantage of internal finance if capital gains are taxed
at concessionary rates, and in some cases this can reduce the tax wedge on
an investment project.
Consider, for example, the simple case with no inflation, no wealth
taxes, no capital gains taxes, and no investment grants. Discount rates for
this case are shown in equation (7.2), and the saver's return is shown in
equation (7.3). With economic depreciation at replacement cost, the
pretax return reduces to p/(l — T), as shown in equation (7.5). The total
tax rate on debt is m, on new share issues is T + m (1 — T) , and on retained
earnings is T, as shown in equations (7.6). An increase in m thus raises
effective tax rates for debt and new share issues but leaves unchanged the
rate for retained earnings. With other than economic depreciation, how-
ever, the expression for the pretax return does not reduce to equation
(7.5). To reduce the expression forp in a different way, suppose actual
depreciation (8) is zero. Then A > 0 represents "accelerated" deprecia-
tion, and a higher discount rate reduces the present value of depreciation
allowances. With this alteration, the expression for the gross return p
changes from (7.1) to
(7.7) p = ^l,
1 — T
and the effective tax rate on retained earnings changes from T to
(7.8) f=i_J^H.
\-A
Now a change in the personal tax rate m affects t for projects financed
from retained earnings according to
(7 9) *L= ~ t
1 ~
 T) . M . iE.
dm [I-A]
2 dp dm'
Withp = r{\ — m), the discount rate for retained earnings falls asm rises
(dp/dm «£ 0). Since dAldp is negative, and T is less than one, the effective
tax rate also falls as m rises.
The effect on any single asset or industry depends on the share of
retained earnings as a source of finance. In the countries studied here,
other sources of finance are large enough that the overall effective tax
rate does in fact increase with the personal tax rate.
8
8. In an alternative methodology, Bradford and Fullerton (1981) assume that firms
arbitrage between debt and real capital such that the net-of-tax return to the corporation is
equalized. Since r (1 - T) would be saved by retiring a unit of debt, the same must be earned291 Sensitivity to Assumed Relation
7.5 Sensitivity to Assumed Relation
between Inflation and Interest Rates
In the fixed-r calculations above, we assume that arbitrage eliminates
differences in net-of-tax interest rates, except for differences in personal
tax rates among owners. In this case the same real interest rate r is earned
on any investment. Because of tax differences, then, the pretax returns/?
must differ among investments. While we hold r constant across invest-
ments at any inflation rate, this assumption provides no guide to correct
comparisons among inflation rates. There is no arbitrage story to be told
here, and we are concerned simply with the choice of r at which to
evaluate the tax rate. With a linear tax system the choice would not
matter, but in practice nonlinearities necessitate an assumption to enable
us to make comparisons for ceteris paribus changes in the rate of infla-
tion. For this purpose we typically hold constant the average real rate of
return to savers. (We could hold / - IT constant instead, but this real
interest rate is relevant to only one saver, tax-exempt institutions.) This
assumption implies a particular relation between the inflation rate and
the nominal interest rate, and the purpose of this section is to investigate
alternative assumptions about this relation.
In the fixed-r case, we may interpret rF as the interest rate that would
exist if there were no inflation. In such a case, the average posttax return
to savers would be ~s = rF{\ — in), where m is the weighted average of
different owners' personal marginal tax rates. If inflation increased to the
rate TT, and the nominal interest rate rose to a value /, then in real terms
the average saver would received = i{\ — in) — TT. If the average real
return to savers is to be constant across inflation rates, by assumption,
then we must set these two expressions equal to each other and solve for
the nominal interest rate as:
(7.10) i = rF +
1-m
Because nominal interest is subject to tax, inflation must add more than
point-for-point to the nominal interest rate for the real after-tax return to
be constant. In our calculations above, we do not mean to claim that
inflation does add more than point-for-point to nominal interest. Rather,
equation (7.10) is a natural consequence of the standard we use for
comparing across inflation rates.
Other standards might be employed, of course, and we now investigate
their implications for our results. We stress, however, that the choice of
by a new investment in any asset using any source of finance. This net rate is always the firm's
discount rate, so m cannot affect the gross return p. However, when the income from the
asset is retained, distributed, or paid out in interest, different personal tax treatments imply
that the net returns 5 must differ. Thus, when risk is ignored, one can assume either that
individuals arbitrage away differences in s, or that firms arbitrage away differences in source
of finance, but not both.292 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
standard has nothing whatever to do with an empirical relationship
between inflation and nominal interest rates. It merely determines the
fixed value of r at which we evaluate effective tax rates. One alternative
standard is to follow Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980), who find a roughly
constant real after-tax rate of return in the corporate sector. If corpora-
tions successfully arbitrage between bonds and real capital, then the real
after-tax return they earn on an investment must be the same as the real
net interest saved by retiring a bond, namely, rF{\ — T) with no inflation
or /(I - T) — IT with inflation at rate TT. Assuming equality of these
expressions across inflation rates implies
(7.11) i = *
1-T
Feldstein and Summers (1978), on the other hand, have estimated that
inflation adds approximately point-for-point to nominal interest rates.
This is described as the result of two countervailing forces within the tax
system. Taxation of nominal interest tends to raise i by more than TT to
keep the real net return constant, while historical cost depreciation and
taxation of nominal capital gains tend to reduce the real net return that
can be earned. Summers (1981) makes a stronger statement, that nominal
interest rates rise by at most the inflation rate, if at all. This empirical
finding can be summarized as
(7.12) i = rF+TT.
In the absence of taxes, (7.12) would keep borrowing and lending
opportunities independent of the rate of inflation. Since Irving Fisher
originally considered the case without taxes, (7.12) has been referred to
as "strict Fisher's law" (Bradford and Fullerton 1981). In a tax system
where all nominal interest receipts are taxed at the rate T and all nominal
interest payments are tax deductible, (7.11) would keep real borrowing
and lending opportunities independent of inflation. This relationship has
been referred to as "modified Fisher's law." In the other relationship
used above, equation (7.10), we account for varying tax rates on nominal
interest income by keeping the average saver's opportunities indepen-
dent of inflation. It can, of course, be thought of as a different modifica-
tion to Fisher's law.
When inflation is zero, all versions of Fisher's law imply the same
result. When inflation is positive, however, the choice among these
standards has an effect on tax rate estimates. Table 7.10 shows overall tax
rates for each country, using actual inflation and standard 1980 param-
eters (only the fixed-r case is presented). In the middle rows of table 7.10,
where the standard assumption of equation (7.10) holds, the effective tax
rates match those from table 7.2 above. In the bottom set of rows, where
(7.11) holds, the effective tax rates in all countries are reduced. Because
(7.11) holds constant the real return after corporate taxes, additional293 Sensitivity to Assumed Relation
Table 7.10 Overall Tax Rates for Alternative Assumptions about the
Effect of Inflation on Nominal Interest, Fixed-r Case
(actual inflation, 1980 parameters, %)
United West United
Kingdom Sweden Germany States
i = r + ir p 1.5 2.3
Equation (7.12) 5 0.7 -0.2
p-s 0.8 2.6
(p-s)/p 51.5 110.2
/ = r+—^ p 5.5 6.0
l~
m s 3.9 2.8
Equation (7.10) p-s 1.7 3.2
(p-s)/p 30.0 53.6
i = r+-^— p 16.1 6.5
!~
T s 12.1 3.2


























inflation serves to increase the real return after personal taxes. To meet
the higher required net return, assets must earn more before tax as well.
The result is similar to consideration of figures 7.2 to 7.5, where higher
rates of return imply lower tax rates.
In the top rows of table 7.10, where strict Fisher's law applies, effective
tax rate estimates in each country are increased. Because inflation adds
only point-for-point to nominal interest, and because nominal interest is
fully taxable in these countries' tax systems, inflation reduces the real
after-tax returns s (except for tax-exempt institutions). The assets need
only earn a lower pretax return p. While the tax wedges (p - s) are all
smaller, as shown in the table, division by small values of/? implies higher
tax as a proportion of gross returns. In fact, individual pretax returns are
often negative under strict Fisher's law, so the use of effective tax rates
presents more of a problem generally. We provide p and s separately in
the table for this reason.
9
With strict Fisher's law, the ordering of country tax rates is altered.
Germany takes second place, and Sweden acquires the highest tax rate
estimate. The inflation rate in Germany is low, however, so the taxation
of nominal interest does not reduce s or p as much in that country as it
does in Sweden. The high rate in Sweden reflects a low denominator,
since the wedge is still higher in Germany.
To give an idea of how these assumptions might affect the breakdown
of effective tax rates within a country, table 7.11 presents detailed results
for the United States. For any individual combination, p is always lower
9. The choice among equations (7.10) to (7.12) also affects the relation between inflation
and effective tax rates. While curves in figure 7.1 correspond to equation (7.10), similar
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under strict Fisher's law (in the first column) than it is under either
modified version of Fisher's law. The tax wedges (p — s) are also lower,
but dividing by p provides tax rates that are higher. The subsidy for debt is
so large that p is very close to zero, and the subsidy rate is misleadingly
large. In fact, since further inflation reduces real net return still more
under strict Fisher's law, calculations for 10 percent inflation imply that/?
is negative for the average debt-financed United States investment. The
net return s is small but positive, so this subsidized investment would
show a large positive tax "rate."
These sections have demonstrated that effective tax rates (p - s)lp
may not be useful indicators of the total tax or subsidy on a given marginal
investment. They are not very stable at low values of the pretax return,
and they may even have the wrong sign. We recommend great care in
their use and interpretation, and, in addition to the tax rate, we suggest
using the tax wedge (/? — s), which is more stable and always has the right
sign.
7.6 Summary
We have tried in this chapter to present effective marginal tax rate
calculations in a number of ways for each country. While these results
depend fundamentally upon the basic methodology chosen for our study,
they depend also on a number of additional assumptions. In particular,
the results reflect our decision to look at the statutory provisions that
determine the tax liability on a marginal investment in each combination
of asset, industry, source of finance, and owner. The precise values of the
estimated tax rates depend upon our choice of a given value for the pretax
rate of return on all projects in the fixed-/? case, and upon our choice for
the interest rate earned on all projects in the fixed-/- case.
Table 7.12 summarizes the major findings for each country. In the first
row the tax rates refer to the fixed-p case, with a pretax annual return of
10 percent on all assets. In the second row they are based on a fixed real
interest rate of 5 percent per annum for all assets. These fixed-r results are
higher than the corresponding tax rates for the fixed-p case, but the
ranking of the countries is the same. We find the highest overall effective
tax rates in Germany, followed by Sweden, the United States, and the
United Kingdom. As shown above, this ranking is unaffected by the
values of p and r at which the tax rates are evaluated. As discussed in
chapter 2, it is the fixed-/? results that are more relevant for an analysis of
the incentive to save and invest.
A major issue in all countries is the effect of inflation on effective tax
rates. The overall effective tax rates for inflation rates between zero and
15 percent are plotted for each country in figure 7.1. The surprising result

































Table 7.12 Summary of Overall Effective Tax Rates in Each Case
Table United West United
Number Case Kingdom Sweden Germany States
7.1 Actual, fixed-/?
7.2 Actual, fixed-/-
7.3 Zero inflation, fixed-/?
7.4 Change in t for change in TT, fixed-/?
7.5 With U.S. weights, fixed-/?
7.6 With U.S. inflation, fixed-/?
7.7 With U.S. depreciation rates, fixed-/?
7.8 With U.S. depreciation, weights,
and inflation, fixed-/?
7.9 With U.S. depreciation, weights, 42.3 69.8 68.4 49.9
and inflation, fixed-r
percent mean rate at zero inflation, but they diverge dramatically as
inflation increases. Tax rates in Sweden rise with inflation, while those in
Britain fall with inflation. In Germany, overall taxes rise initially because
of historical cost depreciation, but they eventually fall as nominal interest
deductions become more important at higher rates of inflation. The curve
for the United States is similarly shaped, but tax rates level off only at a 15
percent inflation rate. At lower inflation rates, the effective marginal tax
rates rise with inflation. The fourth row of table 7.12 shows the changes in
taxes when inflation increases from 6 to 7 percent in each country.
We tried also to decompose tax rate differences into those attributable
to differences in rates of inflation, the allocation of investment, and
actual depreciation rates, as opposed to differences in tax parameters
themselves. Table 7.12 summarizes these results, indicating that none of
these differences taken by itself had a major influence on the spread of tax
rates, but that in total they do have some influence. Effective tax rates are
somewhat more equal among countries when only tax parameter differ-
ences remain.
A very important aspect of our study is not captured by any of these
overall effective tax rate calculations. That is, the overall tax rates con-
ceal a wide distribution of individual effective tax rates within each
country. To summarize these differences in each country, figures 7.6 to
7.9 provide histograms for the actual inflation rate with 1980 parameters.
For the height of each bar in the histogram, we add together the capital
stock weights for any individual combinations that are taxed at effective
rates falling in each 10 percent interval between - 320 percent and + 200
percent.
These bounds are chosen because at least one combination in the
United Kingdom is taxed at a - 312 percent rate. Appendix B shows the
individual fixed-/? tax rates for each combination, at each inflation rate, in297 Summary
each country. For actual inflation rates, the lowest tax rate anywhere is
the —312 percent rate in Britain, for debt-financed machinery in the
manufacturing sector, where the debt is held by tax-exempt institutions.
At an annual inflation rate of 13.6 percent in the United Kingdom, a
considerable inflation premium in the nominal interest rate is tax deduc-
tible at the corporate level, but for this combination it is not taxed at the
personal level. Machinery receives immediate expensing and in addition
qualifies for a cash grant. At the other extreme, Appendix B shows a
+130 percent rate on an internally financed investment in other industrial
buildings in the United Kingdom, where the equity is held by households.
Buildings receive only straight-line depreciation, and other industry re-
ceives smaller grants than manufacturing. Because of disparate tax treat-
ments of different assets, industries, sources, and owners, figure 7.6
shows a relatively flat distribution of tax rates in Britain. They extend
from —312 to +130 percent, with no more than 12 percent of the capital
stock taxed within a single ten-point interval. This implies a very high
variance of marginal tax rates.
A similarly flat distribution is shown for Sweden in figure 7.7. Again,
no more than 12 percent of the capital stock is taxed at rates falling within
any ten-point interval. In this case, however, the rates range from —116
to +144 percent. The investment with the lowest tax rate is a machine in
"other industry" financed by bonds sold to tax-exempt institutions.
Although the 11.4 percent grant and 30 percent exponential depreciation
allowances are the same for machinery in all sectors, machinery in other
industry was found to have the highest true rate of economic deprecia-
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Fig. 7.6 Proportion of investment taxed at each rate in the fixed-/? case
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Fig. 7.7 Proportion of investment taxed at each rate in the fixed-/? case
for Sweden.
tion. Reinvestment qualifies for grants at a faster rate, so this asset has the
lowest total tax rate. Other combinations with tax rates less than -110
percent bring the total weight for that interval up to almost 10 percent of
total capital in Sweden. The investment with the highest total tax is a
building in other industry financed by issuing new shares to households.
The Annell deduction in Sweden did not fully mitigate double taxation of
dividends in 1980, so earnings on such an investment are taxed by both
the corporate and the personal tax systems.
West German investments are taxed at a much narrower spread of
rates, as shown in figure 7.8. The lowest tax rate is only — 59 percent, on a
building in manufacturing financed by debt issued to tax-exempt institu-
tions. Machinery in Germany receives relatively long eleven-year tax
lifetimes, as well as a wealth tax rate that is higher than that on buildings.
Interest deductions make the lower building tax rates negative. At the
other end, the highest rate is "only" 102 percent, on inventories financed
internally through equity held by households. (This rate is identical for all
industries.) Inventories receive the highest tax rate because of unfavor-
able inflation accounting practices required for tax purposes, and internal
finance receives the highest tax rate because of taxation at both corporate
and personal levels. Dividends, on the other hand, receive imputation
credit at the personal level for corporate tax already paid.
Unlike the United Kingdom and Sweden, Germany and the United
States have most of their capital stock taxed at rates between zero and 100
percent. Figure 7.9 shows that nearly 30 percent of United States capital
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Fig. 7.9 Proportion of investment taxed at each rate in the fixed-/? case
for the United States.
of United States capital is taxed at rates between - 30 and + 20 percent,
and because rates extend down to - 105 percent, the weighted-average
marginal tax rate is found to be 37 percent in this fixed-p case. As in all
other countries, the least-taxed investment in the United States is
financed by debt sold to tax-exempt institutions, but in this case the asset
is machinery used in the commercial sector. This asset receives lower300 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
grants in commerce and the same depreciation allowances in all sectors,
but the faster actual depreciation rate in commerce means that reinvest-
ment qualifies for those tax advantages more often. The highest tax rate
in the United States is +111 percent, on buildings financed by new shares
sold to households, in either manufacturing or commerce. Buildings
receive less-accelerated depreciation allowances, while dividends are
fully taxed at both corporate and personal levels.
In general, we find that the histograms in figures 7.6 to 7.9 provide
much more useful information than individual overall tax rates in each of
the four countries studied.
These disparate tax treatments in each country would be eliminated
under a comprehensive income tax—that is, with full integration of
corporate and personal tax systems, economic depreciation at replace-
ment cost, no special grants or incentives, no wealth taxes, full indexing,
and the full taxation of accrued real capital gains. In such a case, all
investments would be taxed at the weighted-average personal tax rate.
For comparison purposes, in table 7.13, we calculate this marginal per-
sonal tax rate in each country, taking weighted averages over household
rates on debt and on equity. In order to capture a comprehensive tax
concept, we do not include tax-exempt institutions or insurance com-
panies, nor do we reduce personal rates to account for returns earned in
the form of tax-free banking services. The United States, the United
Kingdom, and West Germany are very close together, at 43-44 percent
tax rates, and Sweden is at a 57 percent rate. Histograms under such a
hypothetical comprehensive income tax would collapse to a vertical line
at the country's single tax rate, applied to 100 percent of the capital stock.
Under a comprehensive consumption or expenditure tax, the histograms
would collapse to a vertical line at a tax rate of zero.
We do not mean to imply that countries could easily switch to a
comprehensive income tax, or that to do so would be desirable. Rather,
these calculations demonstrate another striking contrast: the overall
effective rate in Britain is a full forty percentage points below the average
marginal personal rate, the overall effective rate in Sweden is twenty-one
points below the average personal rate, the effective rate in the United
Table 7.13 Comparison with a Comprehensive Income Tax
United West United
Kingdom Sweden Germany States
Weighted-average personal rate
on debt and equity (m)














Source: Own calculations as described in the text.301 Summary
States is six points below the personal rate, and the effective rate in West
Germany is several points above the personal rate. Our four countries are
quite different in this respect.
Finally, we might naturally ask about the implications of these effective
tax rates for economic growth in each country. Clearly, this is not a study
about comparative capital formation, income growth, or living standards
in the four countries. We have attempted to measure effective marginal
tax rates in each country in a number of ways, but we have not tried to use
these estimates to measure effects on growth, excess burdens, or income
distribution. Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at some summary
growth statistics in light of our tax rate findings. To this end, the bottom
row of table 7.14 reproduces our standard 1980 fixed-p overall effective
tax rates, and the top rows show two average annual growth rates in
constant dollars from 1960 to 1980 in each country. The first growth rate is
for GDP, and the second is for the nonfinancial corporate capital stock,
excluding inventories.
The results are surprising to say the least. If we rank the four countries
by their average annual growth in GDP, we obtain exactly the same order
as when we rank by 1980 effective tax rates. West Germany has the
highest overall effective tax on income from capital and the highest
growth rate. The United States is second in both categories, and Sweden
is third. The United Kingdom has the lowest overall effective tax on
income from capital and the lowest growth rate. If we look at growth of
nonfinancial corporate capital, results are substantially the same. The
United States and Sweden are reversed, but Germany is still the highest
and Britain is the lowest.
Table 7.14 Comparison with
Average annual growth of GDP
in constant prices (1960-80)
Average annual growth of
nonfinancial corporate capital
in constant prices (1960-80)
Weighted standard deviation
of 1980 tax rates
Coefficient of variation








































Source: United Kingdom: Blue Book. Sweden: National accounts. Germany: Bundesbank
and Statistical Office. United States: Survey of Current Business.302 Comparisons of Effective Tax Rates
Nothing here should be construed to imply causation in either direc-
tion. It is certainly possible that the slower-growing countries have
reacted to their slow growth by providing more investment incentives that
reduce overall effective taxes. As can be seen in the bottom three rows of
the table, tax rates have changed over time, in some cases markedly. For
example, tax rates in the United Kingdom were very high in 1960 but
have fallen dramatically since then. This reduction in rates may lead to
higher investment in the future than would otherwise have taken place. It
is also possible that high growth is associated with high taxes on capital if




Table 7.14 also shows the weighted standard deviation of 1980 effective
tax rates in each country. This is a measure of the dispersion of rates that
can be seen in each of the histograms discussed above. If this standard
deviation is divided by the mean of the distribution (the overall effective
tax rate) and expressed as a percentage, we have the coefficient of
variation in the next row of the table.
Another startling result is the ordering of countries according to these
coefficients of variation. Britain has the highest variation of tax rates on
different combinations and the lowest growth from 1960 to 1980. Sweden
is second for both parameters, and the United States is third. Germany
has the lowest coefficient of variation and the highest overall growth.
1
1
These correlations do not, of course, prove that diverse effective tax
rates inhibit growth. Rather, the correlations in table 7.14 are interesting
in themselves. They suggest many possible interpretations and hypoth-
eses, some of which will, we hope, be investigated further and tested
using the estimates of tax rates and data on individual countries that we
have produced in the course of this study.
10. See Fullerton and Gordon (1983) for some elaboration and testing of the idea that
replacement of capital taxes with a labor tax of equal yield can provide a welfare gain.
11. Harberger (1966), of course, suggests that varying effective tax rates cause capital
misallocations and inefficient production. These could reduce overall growth. For this
purpose, however, the standard deviations are more meaningful than the coefficients of
variation.